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Voidable Preferences and Protection
of the Expectation Interest
Thomas H. Jackson* and Anthony T. Kronman**
One of the principal duties of a trustee in bankruptcy is to
marshall the unsecured assets of the bankrupt estate, liquidate
them, and distribute the proceeds among the estate's unsecured
creditors in a statutorily prescribed manner.' In performing this
duty, the trustee enjoys a number of so-called "avoiding pow-
ers," carefully delimited in sections 60, 67 and 70 of the present
Federal Bankruptcy Act.2  These powers enable the trustee to
set aside certain pre-petition transfers made by the bankrupt and
to recover the transferred assets for the benefit of the bankrupt's
unsecured creditors.3 Among the transfers subject to the trust-
* Law clerk to the Honorable William H. Rehnquist, Associate
Justice, United States Supreme Court.
** Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 47, 70, 11 U.S.C. §§ 75, 110 (1970); see,
e.g., J. MOORE & W. PmLuns, DEBTORS' AND CRDITORS' RIGHTS ch. 1, §
2 (1966); J. WrTE & R. SuMMERs, UNIFORMuC COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-1
at 865 (1972).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107, 110 (1970).
3. See generally Cissell v. American Home Assurance Co., 521 F.2d
790 (6th Cir. 1975); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969); 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IX
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.3.1 et seq., at 1289-1346 (1965).
The present Bankruptcy Act's "voidable preference" provision is
found in section 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970). Although the section has
become extremely intricate, due in large part to its treatment of the so-
called equitable lien, see Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Chal-
lenge to After Acquired Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. PA.
L. REV. 194, 200-04 (1959), the core of section 60 is contained in subsec-
tions (a) (1) and (b), 2 G. GILMORE, supra, § 45.4 at 1303. Section 60(a)
(1) defines a preference as:
a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property of a
debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of
an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while in-
solvent and within four months before the filing by or against
him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the
effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain
a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the
same class.
Section 60(b) provides that "[a]ny such preference may be avoided by
the trustee if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby or his
agent acting with reference thereto has, at the time when the transfer
is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent." Thus,
a transfer may be avoided as preferential only after a number of distinct
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ee's avoiding powers are those involving security interests.4
Those sections of the Bankruptcy Act that define the trustee's
avoiding powers provide the principal forum for determining
which pre-bankruptcy security transactions will survive the "acid
test" of bankruptcy and which will not.5
elements are shown, see J. Wmrs & IL. SuiAnms, supra note 1, § 24-
4 at 873; Seligson, Preference Under the Bankruptcy Act, 15 VAND. L.
REv. 115 (1961).
Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1970), contains
two procedures for setting aside certain pre-petition transfers. Section
67 (a) invalidates liens obtained through judicial proceedings within four
months of bankruptcy "(a) if at the time when such lien was obtained
such person was insolvent or (b) if such lien was sought and permitted
in fraud of the provisions of this title." Section 67 (d) is the Bankruptcy
Act's own fraudulent conveyance section. It denounces as fraudulent all
transfers made within one year of the filing of the petition for bank-
ruptcy if, inter alia, "made or incurred without fair consideration by a
debtor who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to
his actual intent. . .," or, "made or incurred with actual intent as distin-
guished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either
existing or future creditors." 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(d) (2) (b), (d) (1970).
Section 70 (c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970), gives the trustee the status
of a lien creditor, whether or not such a creditor of the insolvent debtor
actually exists, "as to all property of the bankrupt at the date of bank-
ruptcy whether or not coming into possession or control of the court."
Section 70 (e) allows the trustee to invalidate any transfer which, under
state or federal law, "is fraudulent as against or voidable for any other
reason by any creditor of the debtor, having a claim provable under this
title." "Fraudulent," in this formulation, means, as it has since Twyne's
Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601), much more than "actual
fraud." See Irving Trust Co. v. Finance Serv. Co., 63 F.2d 694, 695-
96 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.). Since the Bankruptcy Act contains, in
sections 67 (d) and 60, its own fraudulent conveyance and preferential
transfer sections, the principal value of section 70 (e) lies in the fact
that it allows the trustee to take advantage of time limitations in
a state's fraudulent conveyance or voidable preference law if longer than
the time period in sections 67 (d) or 60. See 3 COlLIEaR's ON BANHRUPTCY
f 60.01 at 749 (14th ed. 1975); cf. Barrett v. ,Bank of the Manhattan Co.,
218 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1954) (L. Hand, J.).
4. Section 1(30) of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1970),
defines a "transfer" as including:
the sale and every other and different mode, direct or indi-
rect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an inter-
est therein or with the possession thereof, or of fixing a lien upon
property or upon an interest therein, absolutely or conditionally,
voluntarily or involuntarily, by or without judicial proceedings,
as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge, mortgage,
lien, encumbrance, gift, security, or otherwise- the retention of
a security title to property delivered to a debto shall be deemed
a transfer suffered by such debtor.
5. See, e.g., Coogan & Vagts, The Secured Creditor and the Bank-
ruptcy Act: An Introduction, in 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UA'-IFORIu COMMERCIAL CODE 972
(1963); MacLachlan, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Secured Transactions,
60 CoLum. L. REv. 593, 608 (1960).
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In recent years, section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act-which
empowers the trustee to avoid certain transfers characterized by
the Act as "preferences"--has enjoyed a special pre-eminence in
this regard.6 Although sections 67 and 70 have continued to
generate their share of litigation,7 section 60 has been the focal
point of the considerable controversy produced by the intersec-
tion of the Bankruptcy Act and the new law of chattel security
embodied in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.8 The
most persistently troublesome issue litigated under section 60
has been the appropriate treatment in bankruptcy of the security
interest in after-acquired inventory and receivables broadly vali-
dated by the Article 9 "floating lien."
6. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.3.3 et seq. at 1298-1346;
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COOR-
DINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE UNIFOR1M Co1VIMERCIA CODE
1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 GoRE CoMITmEE]; Kronman, The
Treatment of Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the
Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 110, 112 (1975).
7. See, e.g., In re Smith, 326 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Minn. 1971) (§§
70 (c), 70 (e) (2)) ; In re North American Builders, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 1229
(D. Neb. 1970) (§ 70(c)); In re Vinarsky, 287 F. Supp. 446 (N.D.N.Y.
1968) (§ 70(c)); In re Babcock Box Co., 200 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1961)
(§ 70(c)); In re Buschmann, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 260 (Ref. Dec. E.D. Wisc.
1967) (§ 70(c)). It is somewhat strange that the fraudulent conveyance
provisions of sections 70(e) and 67 (d) have been rarely used. Writing in
1972, J. WHMTE & R. SumMERs, supra note 1, § 24-9 at 892, stated that
"it appears that there is not yet a single post-Code case in which the
trustee has successfully invoked fraudulent conveyance law against an
Article Nine secured creditor."
8. Kronman, supra note 6, at 112, 115-16; NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
CONFERENCE, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF UNIFORMV COM-
MERCIAL CODE AmD BANKRUPTCY ACT 1, 5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
1967 GILMOpE COMMITTEE].
9. The term "floating lien" refers to the various sections of Article
9 whereby
"a security agreement may provide that any or all obligations
covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after-
acquired collateral" (§ 9-204(1)); whereby "[o]bligations . . .
may include future advances .... " (§9-204(3)); whereby a se-
curity interest shifts automatically to the proceeds of collateral
upon disposition thereof (§ 9-306); and whereby the rule of Ben-
edict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), is abrogated (§ 9-205).
Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buyer, 85 YALE L.J. 1,
1 n.1 (1975).
E.F. Corp. v. Smith, 496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974) (noted in 53 TME.
(L. REV. 1343 (1975)); In re Wilco Forest Mach., Inc., 491 F.2d 1041 (5th
Cir. 1974); In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971); DuBay
v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969); Grain Merchants, Inc. v. Union
Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., France
v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 396 U.S. 827 (1969); Owen & McKes-
son v. Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd mem.,
486 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 329 F.
19761
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A proposal currently before Congress would significantly
revise the present Bankruptcy Act.L1 0 Among its many sweeping
reforms, the proposed Act would make a number of important
changes in the language, structure, and scope of the present sec-
tion 60.11 In particular, the section that deals with voidable pref-
Supp. 93 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 452 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1971);
Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 322 F. Sutpp. 62 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 490
F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1973); In re White, 283 F. Supp. 208 (S.D. Ohio 1967);
Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967); see also Fried-
man, supra note 3; Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy,
75 CoM. L.J. 269 (1970); Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Un-
der Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference Prob-
lem, 62 CoLum. L. Rav. 49 (1962); Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 233 (1965); Hogan, Games
Lawyers Play with the Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to Accounts
and Inventory Financing, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 553 (1968); King, Section
9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Does it Insulate the Security
Interest from Attack by a Trustee in Bankruptcy?, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
1117 (1966); Krause, Kripke & Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy
Act: Three Views on Preferences and After-Acquired Property, 42
N.Y.U.L. REv. 278, 282 (1967); Riemer, Bankruptcy-Preference(s)-Con-
flict Between Section 9-108 of Uniform Commercial Code and Section
60(a) of Bankruptcy Act, 70 CoM. L.J. 63 (1965); Note, After-Acquired
Property Security Interests in Bankruptcy: A Substitution of Collateral
Defense of the U.C.C., 77 YALE L.J. 139 (1967).
10. The proposed Act is sponsored by the Commission on Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States. The Commission was created by the
Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468, with a mandate
to "study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes to the [Bank-
ruptcy] Act. . . ." Id. The proposed Act was originally introduced in
1973, but did not pass that session, see H.R. 10792, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). The Commission bill has recently been reintroduced, see S. 236,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). A simi-
lar, but not identical, bill supported by the National Conference of Bank-
ruptcy Judges is also before Congress, see S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
The proposed Act and its supporting commentary are found in RE-
PORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BA/KRUPTCY LAws OF THE UNrTED
STATES, July 1973, pt. I, II, & III, H. Doc. No. 93-137, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. For a general discussion of some
of the changes embodied in the proposed Bankruptcy Act, see SYM-
PoSium-BANKRUPTcY REFORm, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 381 (1973). A brief
discussion of the Act's legislative history is provided in Cyr, The Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1973: Back to the Drafting Board, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 45
(1974).
11. The changes are contained in section 4-607 of the proposed Act.
See REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 201-11, pt. II at 169-75; 1970 GmoRE
CoMMnITTE, supra note 6; Kronman, supra note 6; Note, Section 60 Void-
able Preferences and the UCC: A Hypothetical, 9 GA. L. REV. 685 (1975).
The Commission prepared a summary of the major changes included in
the proposed Act. See REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 201-02:
The Commission recommends a substantial revision of the
preference section of the present Act .... Preferences would
fall into two categories: (a) preferences within three months
[Vol. 60:971
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erences substantially modifies the treatment in bankruptcy of se-
curity interests in after-acquired property. These modifications
have been discussed critically in a recent article by one of the
authors.1
2
In support of their suggested changes in the treatment of
security interests in after-acquired property, the draftsmen 3 of
section 4-607 of the proposed Act offered an interesting but ulti-
of the date of the petition; and (b) preferences between one year
and three months of the date of the petition. As to the former,
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the
date of the transfer would be immaterial, and insolvency would
be presumed during the entire three month period preceding the
date of the petition. As to the latter category of preferences,
the familiar requirement of reasonable cause to believe the
debtor was insolvent would be retained, and the trustee would
have the burden of proving insolvency. Only transfers to per-
sons having a close relationship to the debtor are open to attack
under the latter category; they are members of the immediate
family, partners, affiliates, directors, officers, and managing
agents.
The Commission further recommends that certain transfers
which are not within the policy reasons for the preference pro-
visions be excepted from preference attack. Transfers of an ag-
gregate value of less than $1,000 to a creditor not closely related
to the debtor during the three-month period are not subject to
attack. Most absolute sales and all transfers in payment of
debts for personal services, debts for utilities incurred within
three months of the petition, and debts for inventory paid within
three months of the delivery of the inventory in the ordinary
course of debtor's business should not be subject to preference
attack.
The Commission further recommends that the problems
arising due to the interplay of the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act be put to rest by rec-
ognizing the validity of the after-acquired property clause as to
inventory and receivable financing, but limiting its effects so
that improvements in position during the three-month period at
the expense of the estate may be set aside as preferential. The
Commission also recommends that enabling loans be expressly
protected and that protection given as a result of subsequent ad-
vances be increased.
In light of the recommendations of the Commission to
shorten the period of vulnerability from four to three months
and to eliminate the requirement of establishing reasonable
cause to believe the debtor insolvent, the Commission recom-
mends that a judicial lien be handled as any other preference.
There no longer is a need for separate treatment.
12. Kronman, supra note 6.
13. The proposals of the Bankruptcy Commission concerning the
treatment of voidable preferences (which are contained in section 4-607)
closely track a revision of section 60 of the present Bankruptcy Act that
was prepared for and accepted by the National Bankruptcy Conference.
That revision was the product of the Conference's Committee on the Co-
ordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commercial Code.
Professor Grant Gilmore was the Chairman of the Committee. Refer-
ences in this article to "the draftsmen" of the voidable preference section
of the proposed Act refer to the Gilmore Committee.
1976]
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mately incomplete theory which attempts to articulate the princi-
ples that ought to govern the protection and avoidance, in bank-
ruptcy, of all security interests of this sort.14 The draftsmen
reasoned as follows: In his debtor's bankruptcy, a secured party
should be permitted to retain only those benefits for which he
has legitimately bargained. A secured party does not bargain
for windfall gains that "accidentally" increase the value of his
collateral. According to the draftsmen, any increase in the value
of a debtor's inventory or receivables during the three month
period immediately preceding his bankruptcy will almost cer-
tainly be the result of either a windfall gain-i.e., a gain not in
"the normal course of a business declining into bankruptcy" I' -
or manipulative conduct on the part of an interested creditor.
The debtor's trustee should therefore be empowered to avoid a
security interest in inventory or receivables to the extent that
the value of the collateral has increased during the three months
prior to bankruptcy, if the debt was itself undercollateralized
when the three month period began.
Underlying this analysis was the crucial, and we believe cor-
rect, assumption that the aim of any preference section must be
14. The Gilmore Committee stated that "[i]f a fair and sensible res-
olution of the underlying policy issues is available,. . . a statutory revi-
sion is indicated... ." 1970 GiLMORE Coz nVmnT supra note 6, at 7. It
recognized that the DuBay proposition, which prevented the avoidance
in bankruptcy of any perfected Article 9 after-acquired property security
interest "[went] beyond need or reason. . . ." Nonetheless, it warned
that "the time has long since passed when it would have been possible
to outlaw either inventory financing or receivables financing." Id. at 17.
Recognizing these "facts of life," th. Gilmore Committee set out to
achieve a compromise.
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States also
attempted to formulate a general theory of bankruptcy, which was not
focused specifically on the concept of voidable preferences. See REPORT,
supra note 10, pt. I, ch. 3 at 61-84 (entitled "A Philosophical Basis for
a Federal Bankruptcy Act"). The Commission noted that no prior the-
ory of bankruptcy law had ever been explicated:
No coherent, well developed general policy or philosophy has
come to the Commission's attention that takes into account the
scope of the Act and the experience under it. The major inade-
quacy of extant "philosophical" statements about bankruptcy is
the failure to account for the overriding goals of the bankruptcy
process in the context of its relationship with other economic and
social processes, such as the credit economy.
Id. at 61. In particular, the Commission rejected the philosophical state-
ment contained in Shuchman, An Atempt at a "Philosophy of Bank-
ruptcy," 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 403 (1973) (Professor Shuchman was Deputy
Director of the Bankruptcy Commission). See Kennedy, Forward:
Bankruptcy Reform-1973, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 381, 390 (1973),
15. 1970 Q o.moRE COATwxEE, supea note 6, at 17.
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to balance the competing interests of secured and unsecured
creditors. However, because they failed to identify these inter-
ests with sufficient precision, the draftsmen were led to mistak-
enly conclude that a secured party does not bargain for windfall
gains.1 6 This error prevented the draftsmen from appreciating
the extent to which the balance struck by section 4-607(d)
interferes with the legitimate contractual expectations of a credi-
tor with a security interest in inventory or receivables."7
Despite these flaws, the draftsmen intended their theory to
serve as a general intellectual framework for systematically ana-
lyzing the concept of a voidable preference and the conflicting
principles and interests which this concept embodies.' The
generality of the theory is its greatest virtue. Although an
enormous amount has been written on the modern law of prefer-
ences, it is remarkable that no one has yet articulated a theory of
comparable breadth.19
Historically, the law of voidable preferences developed as a
branch of the law of fraudulent transfers.20  For more than a
16. See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 78-84 infra.
18. See 1970 GrmoRE COMMIaTrE, supra note 6, at 2, 15-16; note 28
infra. That the draftsmen found it necessary to construct a-general the-
ory of preferences in defense of their suggested changes regarding secu-
rity interests in after-acquired property is understandable in light of
their own statement that "the appropriate treatment of so-called revolv-
ing credit arrangements secured by inventory and receivables" presented
the "most difficult problem" to be resolved in redrafting section 60. 1970
GILMORE COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 2.
19. In its final report, the Gilmore Committee wrote "considerable
progress has been made toward the goal of achieving as clear a statement
of the underlying issues (which are themselves obscure, troubling and
vexed by the ghosts of past controversy) as can be hoped for." Id. at
3. Cf. REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 61; Note, Rosenberg v. Rudnick:
An Examination of the Potential Conflict Between the After-Acquired
Property Provisions of Article 9 of the U.C.C. and Section 60(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 678, 682-88 (1968) (discusses "policy
considerations" underlying section 60 in terms of historical concepts
only).
20. See Kronman, supra note 6, at 111 n.4. In Worseley v. DeMat-
tos, 97 Eng. Rep. 407 (1758), Lord Mansfield wrote that a preferential
transfer, if due solely to the act and will of the bankrupt, was "not a
payment in the regular and commercial course of dealing and business,"
but rather, was "a fraudulent transaction and therefore void with respect
to other creditors." See also Alderson v. Temple, 98 Eng. Rep. 165 (1768)(L. Mansfield, J.); 1 W. COOKE, BxARUrYTCY LAWS 376 (4th ed. 1799)
("The delivery of property to a creditor in contemplation of immediate
bankruptcy is considered as fraudulent, notwithstanding the delivery is
made in satisfaction of a bona fide debt."). The early history of pref-
erences, prior to its judicial adoption by Lord Mansfield in Worseley v.
19761
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century, however, preference law has been moving in a direction
away from the inherent subjectivism of the "fraud" idea 21 and
DeMattos, is traced by Referee Hotchkiss in In re Hall, 4 Am. Bankr.
R. 671, 679-81 (W.D.N.Y. 1900):
Preferences were originally lawful. The debtor merely pre-
ferred to pay one creditor to the exclusion of the others; the debt
was a sufficient consideration. That is, they were originally
lawful even as against other creditors; but the idea of pro rata
distribution having been expressed in the statute of 1623, known
as 21 Jac. I c. 19 (sec. 7), and human nature being then not un-
like that with which we are familiar, the giving of a preference
was made a crime and the offender declared liable to lose one
of his ears and to sit two hours in the pillory. It was, however,
as yet merely a public and not a private wrong.
By the time Lord Mansfield wrote the opinion in Worseley, however, the
"wrong" had come to be perceived as a form of fraud. "Thus originated
the 'conventional fraud' known to the courts and the business world as
a preference." In re Hall, supra, at 680. Similarly, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in a case arising under the National Bankruptcy
Act of 1800, described preferences as fraudulent, Locke v. Winning, 3
Mass. 324, 325-26, 328 (1807) (Sedgwick, J.) :
A principal object of the bankrupt law is that the property
of the bankrupt in all his estate, at the time of the act of bank-
ruptcy, by that act shall cease; and at the same time, by relation,
vest in the assignee, to be equally distributed among his cred-
itors, in proportion to the sums respectively due to them. It is
most manifest, then, that every act done with intention to defeat
this purpose, is a fraud against the law, and therefore void.
If indeed it be true, as it undoubtedly is, that every attempt
to defeat the public law is fraudulent and void, it then follows,
that the delivery of property to a creditor, in contemplation of
bankruptcy, is fraudulent notwithstanding the delivery is made
in satisfaction of a bona fide debt.
Chief Justice Parsons also called it "a fraud upon the other creditors,"
id. at 329. Justice Parker, however, used language suggestive of a more
objective theory of preferences:
The fact agreed, that the notes in question were transferred to
the defendant in contemplation of an act of bankruptcy, appears
to me to settle the case. It is true, upon general principles of
law, that such a transaction would be good and valid....
Where a debtor, in failing circumstances, invites a creditor to
take security, or gives to a favorite creditor notice of his circum-
stances, in order that he may secure himself, contemplating
bankruptcy; to support such a preference in a court of law would
be to destroy the very end and purpose of the bankrupt system,
which is to distribute the effects of the debtor among all his
creditors.
Id. at 325.
21. See Van Iderstine v. Nat'l Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913)
("One is inherently and always vicious; the other innocent and valid,
except when made in violation of the express provisions of a statute.
One is malum per se and the other malum prohibitum,--and then only
to the extent that it is forbidden."); Canright v. General Finance Corp.,
35 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Ill. 1940), aff'd, 123 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1941); 3 COL-
IrER's ON BANKRuPcY, supra note 3, 60.03 at 763-66; 2 G. GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 378 at 655 (1940) ("Thus
the English preference . . .has a meaning that is very strange to the
American lawyer of today.").
[Vol. 60:971
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toward a set of principles based exclusively upon an objective
determination of the financial condition of the debtor and the
effect of the alleged preference on third party creditors.22 This
development culminates in the proposed Bankruptcy Act, which
does away with the vestiges of subjectivism contained in the pres-
ent section 60.23 Unfortunately, as the law of preferences out-
grew the concept of fraud on which it was originally founded, no
general theory appeared to give expression to the principles
underlying the objectivist tendencies of this development. As a
result, the modern law of preferences emerged in a theoretical
vacuum. By and large it has grown through a series of spas-
modic reactions to case law developments24 and changing corn-
22. The concept of a preferential transfer entered American law in
many nineteenth century federal and state bankruptcy acts. At the fed-
eral level, an explicit prohibition of preferential transfers first appeared
in the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). Under
the influence of Justice Story, the American law of preferences gradually
developed a theoretical basis distinct from its English predecessor. Ac-
cording to Story, the existence of a preference should depend not upon
the debtor's motives or state of mind, but upon his financial condition
at the time of transfer. Everett v. Stone, 8 F. Cas. 898 (No. 4577) (C.C.D.
Me. 1844); Arnold v. Maynard, 1 F. Cas. 1181 (No. 561) (C.C.D. Mass.
1842). If a transfer made by an insolvent debtor gave a creditor an ad-
vantage over co-creditors, it should be set aside as preferential regardless
of the debtor's motives. Story's reasoning was adopted by other courts
and finally ratified by the Supreme Court in Toof v. Martin, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 40 (1871), a case involving the preference section of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878). Thus, what
might be called the "objective" theory of preferences has long been ac-
cepted in American law. But cf. In re Hall, 4 Am. Bankr. R. 671, 693
(Ref. Dec. W.D.N.Y. 1900) (interpreting 1898 Act and distinguishing be-
tween "the guilty creditor and the innocent creditor").
For a detailed discussion of the early development of the law of pref-
erences in England and America, see 2 G. GLENN, supra note 21, § 378
at 654-59.
23. Section 4-607(a) (1) applies a wholly objective standard in de-
termining preferential treatment during the three month period. Section
4-607 (a) (2) of the proposed Act utilizes a "reasonable cause to believe"
of insolvency test, but this standard is applicable only to the longer pref-
erence period relating to family and affiliates of the debtor:
(a) Right to Recover. Except as otherwise provided in this
section, a trustee may recover property of the debtor transferred
to pay or secure, directly or indirectly, an antecedent debt of
a creditor if the transfer occurred when the debtor was insol-
vent and occurred either(1) within three months before the date of the petition or,(2) if the creditor was a member of the immediate family,
a partner, an affiliate, a director, an officer, or a managing
agent of or for the debtor, who had reasonable cause to be-
lieve the debtor was insolvent at the date the transfer oc-
curred, within the period commencing one year before and
ending three months before the date of the petition. ...
See also REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 201.
24. Discussing the evolution of bankruptcy law in general, the Coin-
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mercial needs 25-a process uninformed by any clear conceptual
mission on Bankruptcy Laws concluded, that
The course of bankruptcy and related law, policy, and processes
has not proceeded continuously and lineally through the cen-
turies toward a broad, evolving goal. Instead, as well exampled
by the history of bankruptcy in the United States, including the
events leading to the 1938 amendments to the Act of 1898, the
development has occurred spasmodically. Major changes in leg-
islation have been proposed in response to dramatic economic,
political and social currents and events and have been enacted
after intense debate over broad policy issues and specific ob-jectives.
REPoRT, supra note 10, pt. I at 62-63. This is especially true with respect
to preference law which, since 1898 at least, has been modified repeatedly
to resolve problems posed by particular case law developments. Section
60, added to the Bankruptcy Act in 1898, Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541,
§ 60, 30 Stat. 562, was amended in 1903, Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, §
13, 32 Stat. 799; in 1910, Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 11, 36 Stat. 842;
in 1926, Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 14, 44 Stat. 666; in 1938, Act of
June 27, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 869; in 1950, Act of March 18, 1950,
Pub. L. No. 461, ch. 70, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 64 Stat. 24; and minor
changes were made in 1963, Act of May 8, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-17, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 77 Stat. 14. The major amendments, those occurring in
1938 and 1950, were explicitly formulated in response to evolving Su-
preme Court doctrine. The 1903, 1910, and 1926 amendments attempted,
at least in part, to invalidate judicial protection of "secret transfers"-
transfers executed but not disclosed by recording or by the change of
possession. For an excellent discussion of this early pattern of court deci-
sion and legislative response, see Hirschfeld v. Nogle, 5 F. Supp. 234
(E.D. Ill. 1933); see also Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klau-
der, 318 U.S. 434 (1943). However, these early attempts were not well
received by the courts. Cases causing most difficulty were: Carey v.
Donohue, 240 U.S. 430 (1916); Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U.S. 90 (1912);
Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U.S. 91 (1905); Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196
U.S. 516 (1905). In the 1938 amendments to section 60, Congress took
dead aim at "equitable liens" of the Sexton v. Kessler variety, intending
to eliminate them once and for all. See Hearings on H.R. 6439 & H.R.
8046 Before the House Comm on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
9, at 123 (1937). But the draftsmen, in utilizing a "bona fide purchaser
test" went far beyond their mark and brought down not only equitable
liens of the Sexton v. Kessler type, but also "non-notification accounts
receivable financing arrangements in a great many states and, in all
probability, all inventory financing arrangements in all states." 2 G.
G mORE, supra note 3, § 45.3.3, at 1302. The overbreadth of the 1938
amendment was clearly perceived by the Supreme Court in Corn Ex-
change Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klaud.er, 318 U.S. 434 (1943); following
that case, the draftsmen went back to their drafting boards. The result
was the so-called "lien creditor" test embodied in the 1950 amendments
to section 60. This new test was designed to mitigate the unintentional
severity of the 1938 amendment, without reviving the Sexton v. Kessler
"relation back" doctrine. See H.R. REE. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1949). For a general discussion of the evolution of section 60, see Fried-
man, supra note 3, at 200-04.
25. Accounts receivable and inventory financing developed as com-
mercial necessity broke down the common law's hostility to after-ac-
quired property interests. See 1 G. GiLMoRE, supra note 3, § 2.1 at 25.
Recent attempts to revise section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act have neces-
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grasp of the guiding principles whose conflict shapes this area of
the law.20  The draftsmen's theory represents the first major
attempt at formulating a conceptual basis for the modern objec-
tivist approach to preferences.2 7
Unfortunately, having elevated the discussion of prefer-
ences to a new theoretical high, the draftsmen failed to clearly
identify the conflicting policies underlying modern preference
law.28  This failure, which is reflected in the inadequacies of
section 4-607 itself, is of course a disappointment-but a disap-
pointment that illuminates the general problems of preference
law in a singularly constructive way. The draftsmen's efforts
confirm the necessity of having a general theory as an instru-
ment for the systematic analysis of preference problems and
sarily had to deal with this commercial reality. See 1970 GILMORE COM-
M=E; supra note 6, at 17.
26. See, e.g., 2 G. GLENN, supra note 21, § 375 at 651: "There is
but one conclusion possible, which is that the preference ... nevertheless
must have had a peculiar history, because otherwise one cannot account
for these queer differences." Preference law, while moving both in prac-
tice and in concept well beyond its quasi-fraudulent antecedents, has
stayed nonetheless within the general framework of its original concep-
tion. Instead of simply discarding this older complex of ideas and begin-
ning anew, those who have sought to adapt preference law to its modern
commercial setting have done so by stretching-indeed, by torturing-
its original structural framework. For example, section 60 still utilizes
a "knowledge of insolvency" test, which "was once a thing which meant
a good deal." Id. at 656. The purpose behind this test has become so
problematic that the Bankruptcy Commission, in arguing for the aboli-
tion of a "knowledge of insolvency" test, was able to assert, quite un-
equivocally, that such a test does not have "any rational connection with
the objective of this provision, i.e., to achieve a more equitable distribu-
tion among all of the creditors." REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 19; see
also 1967 GILMoRE COMMiTTEE, supra note 8, at 2-3; G. GLENN, CRED-
ITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 434 at 345-46 (1915); cf. Morris, Bankruptcy
Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating Liens, 54 MWNu.
L. REv. 737, 740-57 (1970).
27. "There is ... a certain artificiality involved in formulating se-
curity interest problems in terms of the preference concept .... The
artificiality is, however, one that the legal profession has long been used
to .... " 1967 GILMOTE COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 6.
28. In the first place, the draftsmen failed to state, in a clear and
precise fashion, the competing interests they were attempting to recon-
cile. It is true that we are told that the aim of the draftsmen in revising
section 60 is "[to resolve] the conflicting interests of the secured and
unsecured creditors in the disaster of bankruptcy." However, the content
of those interests and the reasons for their inevitable conflict are left
unspecified. Because the nature of these conflicting interests is not ex-
plicitly stated, the statutory resolution proposed by the draftsmen fails
to achieve the very compromise which was their guiding objective. See
text accompanying note 80 infra; Kronman, supra note 6, at 141-50.
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provides the foundation for a more complete inquiry into the
competing considerations that such a theory must balance.
In what follows, we shall attempt to trace the main outlines
of an objective theory of preferences, and to demonstrate that
theory's power by applying it to the treatment of security inter-
ests in after-acquired property. Our argument proceeds in the
following fashion: we begin by identifying the two principal
policies which animate preference law and by describing the
unavoidable conflict between them. We then consider four
distinct schemes for the treatment of security interests in after-
acquired property and evaluate each in terms of its success in
reconciling these conflicting policies. Simply stated, our thesis
is that any preference provision affecting security interests of this
sort must realize, simultaneously, two conflicting goals-protec-
tion of the secured party's pre-bankruptcy contractual expecta-
tions and minimization of the social. costs of bankruptcy itself.2 9
I. BASIC POLICIES UNDERLYING THE TREATMENT
OF PREFERENCES
A. THE PRESENT AND PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AcTs
Under both the present and proposed Bankruptcy Acts, the
trustee is empowered to set aside as -preferential a limited class of
pre-petition transfers30 made by the bankrupt.31 In several
29. To be sure, the draftsmen of any preference provision must also
consider such factors as certainty, simplicity, and administrative con-
venience. Our purpose here, however, is to discuss the theoretical under-
pinnings of preference law in particular, not considerations that bear on
legal issues in general For an extended discussion of the applicability
of certainty, simplicity, and convenience in the present context, see gen-
erally Kronman, supra note 6.
30. The Act's expansive definition of the term transfer indicates the
variety of transactions which may potentially constitute voidable pref-
erences under section 60. See Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30)
(1970), quoted in note 4, supra; Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182
U.S. 438, 444 (1901) ("The word [transfer] is used in its most compre-
hensive sense. . . ."); Irving Trust Co. v. Kaminsky, 22 F. Supp. 362
(S.D.N.Y. 1937); In re Muir, 212 F. 495 (M.D. Pa. 1914); In re Truitt,
203 F. 550 (D. Md. 1913).
31. See note 3 supra. The basic structure of section 4-607, the pro-
posed Act's voidable preference provision, is relatively straightforward,
and conceptually quite different from section 60 of the present Act. Sec-
tion 4-607 (a) defines as preferential all transfers which "occur" within
three months of the date the petition was filed if the debtor was insol-
vent when the transfer occurred. Then, sections 4-607 (b), (c), and (d)
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respects, however, the proposed Act's definition of this class
differs from the definition contained in the present Act.3 2 One
of the most important differences involves the treatment of
security interests in after-acquired inventory and receivables.
Although the present Act has recently been construed in such a
set forth exceptions to this general rule. Section 4-607(b) contains an
exception for transfers of an aggregate value less than $1,000, for statu-
tory or common law liens "not invalid under section 4-606," and for
transfers which do not result in the creditor obtaining "a greater percent-
age of his claim than other creditors of the same class." Section 4-607 (c)
contains two exceptions: one for enabling loans, which is comparable
to that existing in section 9-107 (b) of the Code (although the Code's
strict tracing requirement is not repeated, see 1970 Gn.MoRE COMMITTEE,
supra note 6, at 14) and another "to the extent of new value given at
the time of the transfer or at any time thereafter." Section 4-607(d)
contains a limited exception for after-acquired receivables and inven-
tory:
(d) Exception: Receivables and Inventory. If inventory was
acquired or receivables arose and became collateral covered by
a security agreement, a perfected transfer of such inventory or
receivables or the proceeds of either is not voidable except to
the extent that the transferee has improved his position by an
increase in the value of the security at the expense of the estate.
The transferee has so improved his position if(1) the debt secured exceeds the aggregate value of all se-
curity for the debt three months before the filing of the peti-
tion or, if new value was first given under the security
agreement during the three-month period, on the date new
value was first given; and
(2) the amount by which the debt exceeded the value of
the security has been reduced or eliminated by the date of
the petition....
REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 167. The essential operation of this section
revolves around its so-called "two-point net improvement test": the
value of the collateral three months prior to the filing of the petition
is compared with the value of the collateral on the date the petition is
filed. If the latter figure is greater than the former, the difference
constitutes a voidable preference which can be set aside by the trustee
under section 4-607 (a). For a discussion of the probable effect of this
section, see Kromnan, supra note 6, at 141-50; note 88, infra.
32. The proposed Act, unlike the present Act, makes the creditor's
knowledge of his debtor's insolvency irrelevant. Compare section 4-607
(a) (proposed Act) with section 60 (a) (present Act). Moreover, the
proposed Act focuses specifically on the types of transactions that either
should or should not be valid, see note 31, supra, while the present Act,
speaking in vague generalities, depends upon a complex lien-creditor
test. See sections 60(a) (2), (6), (7), and (8). See generally REPORT, su-
pra note 10, pt. I at 201-11. Indeed, the Gilmore Committee originally
contemplated drafting a section that would state simply and explicitly
which security interests would be valid in bankruptcy, in what order,
and to what extent. 1967 GILMORE COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 6. Al-
though this approach was eventually abandoned as having come "too late
in the day," 1970 GILMORE COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 1, the proposed
Act's voidable preference section reflects this influence to a certain ex-
tent.
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way as to insulate perfected security interests in after-acquired
property from the trustee's powers under section 60,33 the pro-
posed Act would make interests of this sort vulnerable, in part,
to the trustee's avoiding powers.
34
Despite these differences, the voidable preference sections of
both the present and proposed Bankruptcy Acts reflect a funda-
mentally similar approach to the treatment of security interests.
33. See cases cited note 9, supra. Of the cases mentioned, DuBay
v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969), has been the most widely dis-
cussed. In DuBay, Judge Hufstedler wrote:
Section 60a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "a trans-
fer of property . . . shall be deemed to have been made or suf-
fered at the time when it became so far perfected that no sub-
sequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable
proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the
rights of the transferee."
Congress did not state that a "transfer" occurs when a se-
curity interest attaches or when state law says a conveyance has
been made. Congress provided that a transfer is "deemed" to
have been made when it became "so far perfected" that no sub-
sequent lien creditor could achieve priority. "Transfer" for the
purpose of section 60a(2) is thus equated with the act by which
priority over later creditors is achieved and not with the event
which attaches the security interest to a specific account.
We look to state law, therefore, only to decide the point at
which Rose City's claim to the future accounts was sufficiently
asserted to prevent a subsequent lien creditor from achieving
priority over it in those accounts. That time was the date upon
which Rose City filed its financing statement.
Id. at 1287-88. The Gilmore Committee rightly concluded that, under
the logic of DuBay, "no perfected Article 9 after-acquired property inter-
est in inventory, receivables or any other type of property can ever be
set aside in bankruptcy," 1970 GILmORE COMMaITTEE, supra note 6, at 17.
Ironically, this result extends greater protection to security interests of
this sort than even the draftsmen of Article 9 intended. Section 9-108,
the Code's own none-too-subtle attempt to keep security interests in
after-acquired property from being deemed voidable preferences, con-
tains a significant limitation: only after-acquired property received "ei-
ther in the ordinary course of his [the debtor's] business or under a con-
tract of purchase made pursuant to the security agreement within a rea-
sonable time after new value is given" is to be given protection under
that section. The negative implication of this language is that all other
acquisitions are not to be protected. See Comment 1 to § 9-108:
It [this article] does deny present value status to out of ordinary
course acquisitions not made pursuant to the original loan agree-
ment. This solution gives the secured party full protection as
to the collateral which he may be reasonably thought to have
contracted for; it gives other creditors the possibility, under the
law of preferences, of subjecting to their claims windfall or un-
contemplated acquisitions shortly before bankruptcy.
See also 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.6 at 1313-15; 1967 GILMORE CoM-
MrrEE, supra note 8, at 17.
34. See note 31, supra; Kronman, supra note 6, at 134. In fact, the
unlimited protection such security interests have received under the pres-
ent Act was one of the principal stimuli for revision of section 60. See
1970 GILMORE CoMMITTF, supra note 6, at 2.
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Each scheme represents, at bottom, a compromise that attempts
to strike a reasonable balance between voiding all security trans-
fers and voiding none at all. It is clear that both Acts empower
the trustee to avoid some security transfers but neither Act
makes all transfers of this sort voidable preferences. Only those
transfers made within a specified temporal period and to satisfy
a particular kind of claim (an "antecedent debt") are even
potentially voidable.35 In fact, neither Act permits the trustee to
avoid every member of even the limited class of transfers meet-
ing these two requirements.36
This simple observation underscores an important, if often
overlooked, fact: while the two Acts differ with respect to
where they draw the line between those security transfers that
are preferential and those that are not, both rest upon the
elementary assumption that neither unlimited protection nor
complete invalidation of all the bankrupt's pre-petition security
transfers is acceptable.8 7 Perhaps the most obvious expression
of this shared assumption is the limitation, contained in both
Acts, that a transfer may be avoided as preferential only if it
occurs within a specified period of time immediately preceding
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.38 Although the use of
such a "preference period" is desirable for a number of rea-
sons, 39 neither Act regards this conceptual device, taken by
35. See § 60 (a) (present Act); §§ 4-607 (a), (g) (1) (proposed Act).
36. The present Act requires knowledge of insolvency as well,
and under the proposed Act a transfer meeting these two requirements
may not be voided unless it also meets the "two-point net improvement"
test.
37. Cf. REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 77:
Thus it is both infeasible and unwise for the bankruptcy
process simply to adopt the external rules of creditors' rights
to carry out a policy of fair and equitable treatment of creditors'
claims. Instead, internal standards of two kinds are required:
distributive standards that take into account the legal status of
claims and allocative standards that reflect the social and eco-
nomic consequences of the burden of loss.
33. The present Act provides for a four-month preference period,
§ 60 (a), and the proposed Act, a three-month period, § 4-607(a). See
also S. 235, H.R. 32, supra note 10, at § 4-607 (four-month period). With
the exception under the proposed Act of certain transactions of the
debtor with family members and business associates, transfers for ante-
cedent debts outside of these time limits are not vulnerable to attack
as voidable preferences.
39. REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 77:
A preliminary distributive standard must establish a set of
temporal rules for determining when the goals of the bankruptcy
process succeed the goals of external processes in which cred-
itors' claims arise. The standard should provide for a point in
time, or series of points in time for different kinds of transac-
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itself, as an adequately refined tool for determining which secur-
ity transfers should be avoided and which should not.40 Thus,
under both Acts, only certain transfers occurring within the
preference period are voidable. In demarcating the class of
preference-period transfers that are voidable by the trustee, both
Acts introduce additional principles and requirements. How-
ever, the principles utilized by each Act differ considerably. The
most interesting and controversial differences between the voida-
ble preference sections of the two Acts-and the only ones that
will be considered in this Article-are those regarding the treat-
ment of security transfers occurring within the preference peri-
od. It is important to note that even with respect to security
transfers of this sort, both Acts are in fundamental agreement
that neither blanket protection nor unlimited voidability are
acceptable alternatives.
41
B. COMPETING PoLIcIES
The fact that both the present and proposed Acts adopt a
middle position between unlimited protection and complete in-
validation is due in large measure to the attempt to reconcile two
competing considerations, 42 neither of which is strong enough to
warrant exclusion of the other in defining the concept of a
voidable preference.43 As both concepts are basic to bankruptcy
tions, prior to the date when the bankruptcy process is invoked.
Otherwise, creditors anticipating bankruptcy and utilizing ex-
ternal creditors' rights laws may gain advantages that violate
the goal of fair and equitable treatment. Bankruptcy rules
avoiding preferential and fraudulent transfers have the objective
of undoing such advantages. However, it is equally necessary
that the division not be set so far back in time as to upset expec-
tations of creditors relying innocently on the rules of external
processes that otherwise apply.
See 3 COLIxER'S ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, f 60.01 at 744:
[ilt is obvious that, if the creditors and debtors could deal with
impunity with the debtor's assets up to the date of bankruptcy,
only tag ends and remnants of unencumbered assets would too
often remain. Bankruptcy liquidation would be a futile proce-
dure. The Act, therefore, must necessarily invalidate certain
transactions that have occurred prior to bankruptcy.
See also Note, The Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Potential
Conflicts, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 411 (1958).
40. See note 36, supra.' The preference period, to be sure, may be
adjusted: the proposed Act shortens the preference period from four
months to three. Yet, just as surely, such a mechanism by itself is too
blunt an instrument to provide the fine tuning required by the "prefer-
ence" concept.
41. See notes 36-37 supra.
42. G. GLENN, CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra note 26, §§
279-86, at 220-25.
43. We are concerned here with the considerations underlying those
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law itself, any preference provision must ultimately reflect an
equitable and intelligent balance of the two."
One of the two principal aims of the law of preferences is to
protect the contractual arrangements fashioned by the bankrupt
and his various creditors during the pre-bankruptcy period.45
Taken as a whole, these arrangements define both the nature
and extent of the risks which the contracting parties have as-
sumed, and the relative priority of the creditors' competing
aspects of bankruptcy law which deal with how creditors will be treated
inter se. This is not to slight what is often considered the primary "pur-
pose" of bankruptcy proceedings-the rehabilitation of debtors. See
Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1966); Hartman v. Utley, 335 F.2d
558 (9th Cir. 1964); In re Schmelzer, 350 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Ohio 1972)
aff'd, 480 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973); Aiken v. Bank of Ga., 101 Ga. App.
200, 113 S.E.2d 405 (1960); 2 G. GMORE, supra note 3, § 45.1 at 1281;
REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 75. But this purpose, which focuses on
the debtor, is unrelated to those interests which should influence the
competing rights of his various creditors. And, "[wihatever purposes
bankruptcy attempts to carry out, it does by working on the creditors
primarily, by compelling them to reorganize their relations to the debtor
or to each other in regard to the debtor's property." Radin, The Nature
of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 9 (1940).
44. Cf. L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAw 28 (1963).
45. 2 G. GILMoRE, supra note 3, § 45.2 at 1284; SENATE COMM. ON nHz
JUDICIARY, 92ND CONG., IST SEss., BANKRUPTCY STUDY PLAN 4 (Comm.
Print 1971). It is clear that
[t]he bankruptcy process affects values on which the open credit
economy depends in order to function. The principal such val-
ues are orderliness, morality, and skill and knowledge. Order-
liness defines the individual authority and power of a debtor and
of his several creditors so that the legal consequences of future
conduct can be reliably anticipated. Morality and respect are
the basis for the reliability that both debtors and creditors will
perform in the future as contractually committed. Skill and
knowledge enable the participants in the open credit economy
to conduct themselves as informed, able contractors in arms
length transactions.
REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 70. The bankruptcy process must proceed
in a manner which supports "the values on which the open credit econ-
omy depends. . . ." Id. at 71. Thus, "[f] or the most part, [claims aris-
ing in the open credit economy] should be recognized in the bankruptcy
process. Their enforcement serves economic values and honors the out-
comes of transactions voluntarily entered, including the parties' contrac-
tual expectations about enforcement rights under external rules." Id. at
78. See Coulter v. Blieden, 104 F.2d 29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 583 (1939); Strauss v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 143 S.C. 422,
141 S.E. 683 (1927); 2 G. GIivORE, supra note 3, § 45.2 at 1287 ("In the
structure of the [Bankruptcy Act] there is a sort of built-in tension be-
tween the basic prescription that security rights are to be recognized and
the administrative procedures which insure that they will be recognized
to the smallest degree possible."); cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. St.
Joe Paper Co., 216 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983
(1955); Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65
CoLUM. L. REv. 232, 252-55 (1965).
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claims against the estate of their common debtor.48 The reasons
for protecting these arrangements, and the bargained-for expec-
tations they embody, are the same as those usually advanced for
supporting the expectation interest in contractual dealings gener-
ally.47 Perhaps the most important of these reasons is that by
protecting the expectation interest we increase the rational cal-
culability of profit-making transactions, and thereby encourage
the general expansion of credit.48 If a trustee in bankruptcy
were permitted to use his avoiding powers to nullify, without
restriction, the priorities for which the bankrupt's secured credi-
tors have bargained, the use of secured transactions as a financ-
ing device would be significantly chilled-perhaps frostbitten.
46. Cf. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S.
156 (1946); G. GLENN, CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra note 26,
§ 2 at 2-3; Morris, supra note 26, at 738.
47. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Dam-
ages: I, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1 (1963); cf.
Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875).
48. It may be said that there is not only a policy in favor of pre-
venting and undoing the harms resulting from reliance, but also
a policy in favor of promoting and facilitating reliance on busi-
ness agreements.... Agreements can accomplish little, either
for their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis
for action. When business agreements are not only made but
are also acted on, the division of labor is facilitated, goods find
their way to the places where they are most needed, and eco-
nomic activity is generally stimulated. These advantages would
be threatened by any rule which limited legal protection to the
reliance interest....
The juristic explanation in its final form is then two-fold.
It rests the protection accorded the expectance on (1) the need
for curing and preventing the harms occasioned by reliance, and(2) on the need for facilitating reliance on business agreements.
From this spelling out of a possible juristic explanation, it is
clear that there is no incompatibility between it and the eco-
nomic or institutional explanation. They view the same phe-
nomenon from two different aspects. The essence of both of
them lies in the word "credit" The economic explanation views
credit from its institutional side; the juristic explanation views
it from its rational side. The economic view sees credit as an
accepted way of living; the juristic view invites us to explore
the considerations of utility which underlie this way of living,
and the part which conscious human direction has played in
bringing it into being.
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 47, at 61-62. Cf. L. FRmEDMAN, CONTRACT
LAw IN AMERIcA-A SOCI.L AN ECONOMIc CASE STUDY 20 (1965); FRIED-
MANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 91 (1959); 1 PARSONS, THE LAW OF
CONTRACT 3 (1855); H. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF THE LAW
251 (1946); M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIc ORGANIZA-
TION 179-202 (Oxford 1947); Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage
Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 292 (1970);
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 630 (1943). See also F. KESSLER & M.
SHARP, CONTRACTS 1, 4-9 (1953); R. POSNER, ECoNo1Ac ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 3.1 at 41-42 (1972); R. PouND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PmLOSOPHY OF
LAW 133-34, 166 (Rev. ed. 1954).
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Like contracts of other sorts, secured contracts embody a set of
expectations that cannot be ignored without frustrating the very
purpose such transactions are designed to serve. Obviously this
result would be undesirable from the standpoint of secured
creditors; but more importantly, it would also harm debtors by
significantly restricting the availability of credit.
49
A second and competing aim of the law of preferences is to
minimize the inevitable social costs associated with bankruptcy
by spreading its impact among all classes of creditors.50 If the
bankrupt's contractual arrangements with his secured creditors
are honored in full and without exception, the bankrupt's insol-
vent condition will of course impact most heavily upon his
unsecured creditors. It is they, in any case, who are bound to
bear the brunt of the economic failure that every bankruptcy
represents. If made to bear too much, however, the unsecured
creditors of the bankrupt may find their own financial health
endangered. Every bankruptcy contains within itself the seeds
of others, of a chain of failed enterprises radiating throughout
the economy. To guard against this danger, which threatens all
classes of creditors-indeed, all participants in the economy-
the trustee is empowered to avoid the contractual rights of the
bankrupt's secured creditors in certain limited cases; 51 by doing
so, he can increase that portion of the bankrupt's estate which
will be applied to satisfy the claims of general unsecured credi-
tors. " If protection of the expectation interest requires that the
49. Cf. Leff, Commentary, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Real-
ism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 460-61 (1974).
50. Cf. REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 78; 2 G. GnMORE, supra note
3, § 45.2 at 1287; R. POUND, supra note 48, at 162-63, 168.
51. See P. COLEmAN, DEBTORS AM CREDiTORS IN AMERcA: INSOL-
VENCY, IMPMSONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTcY 13 (1974):
... legislators wanted the insolvent's property distributed equi-
tably. They knew that the failure of a single merchant or
planter sometimes brought a chain reaction of insolvencies. If
losses could be spread fairly over all creditors this might pre-
vent the collapse of any one of them.
52. Thus, it is frequently said, "equality in distribution!' is one of
the touchstones of bankruptcy law. 2 G. GImmOPx, supra note 3, § 45.2
at 1287; REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 75; Krause, Kripke, & Seligson,
supra note 9, at 282; Kronman, supra note 6, at 142; Seligson, supra note
3, 15 VAND. L. REV. 115 (1961). See Canright v. General Finance Corp.,
35 F. Supp. 841, 844 (E.D. Ill. 1940) ("But the purpose of the Bank-
ruptcy Act is to bring about equality of division of assets amongst
creditors. For the rule that to the diligent creditor belongs the re-
ward, the act substitutes the rule that equality is equity."). See also
Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962); Sampsell v. Imperial Pa-
per & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co.,
299 U.S. 445 (1937); Merchants Bank v. Sexton, 228 U.S. 634 (1913);
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priority of secured claims be respected, reduction of the social
costs of bankruptcy would appear to require that the priority of
such claims occasionally be ignored. 53
IL AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY AND THE
EXPECTATION INTEREST
We have seen that one of the two fundamental objectives of
both bankruptcy law in general, and the law of voidable prefer-
ences in particular, is protection of the hierarchical system of
claims contractually created during the pre-bankruptcy period
by the debtor and his creditors. The organization of this hierar-
chical system is defined by the separate contracts whose terms
establish the jural relation of the bankrupt to each of his individ-
ual creditors. These contracts embody and give legal expression
to a set of shared expectations that form the basis of the parties'
bargain. Viewed abstractly, the particular bargain struck by the
bankrupt and any individual creditor may be conceptualized as
an agreement regarding the distribution, between the parties, of
certain ppecifiable risks.54
Clarke v. Rogers, 228 U.S. 534 (1913); Hansen v. Jonas, 373 F.2d 880 (9th
Cir. 1967); Bank of Matin v. England, 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir.), rev'd
on'other grounds, 385 U.S. 99 (1965); In re Laskin, 316 F.2d 70 (3rd Cir.
1963); Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
635 (1943); In re Pusey & Jones Corp., 192 F. Supp. 233 (D. Del.),
aff'd, 295 F.2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1961); In re Troutman, 20 F. Supp. 256
(W.D.N.Y. 1937); In re Houtman, 287 F. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
53. REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 76:
The fulcrum of the balance between the external goals of the
open credit economy and internal goals of the bankruptcy proc-
ess lies here. The individualistic creditors' rights laws, many
of which are applicable equally to the enforcement of open
credit economy debts and to the enforcement of all other debts,
must be balanced in bankruptcy against rules for fair and equi-
table distribution collectively among all creditors of a debtor.
Cf. L. FULLER, supra note *44, at 28; H. HAvIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PI-
VATE CONTRACT 20 (1961); F. KESSLER & M. SHARP, supra note 48, at 9.
In discussing this balance, we start from the apparently undisputed base-
line proposition that an ordinary perfected security interest is to be fully
protected in bankruptcy. Our focus in this article, therefore, will be on
those additional features of a security interest in after-acquired property
which may justify different treatment.
54. Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal
Devices, 24 CoLu. L. REV. 335 (1924); cf. H. LYoN, RISK PROFIT AND
Loss 25-26 (1943); W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS
20-33 (1970); Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Con-
tract, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 277, 278 (1972); Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk
Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements, 12 J. LAw &
EcoN. 23, 25 (1969); Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel Security: I, 57 YALE L.J.
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By definition, risk concerns the uncertain happening of
future events.rr As an instrument of risk-allocation, a contract
attempts to order the future5 6 by distributing between the parties
the benefits and the misfortunes which its uncertainties may
bring. On this view, the particular "price" 5" one is willing to
pay for a specified set of contract rights will depend ultimately
upon the conclusions one draws regarding the risk-return rela-
tionships among the various future events that may affect the
value of the rights in question.58 Where two parties have struck
517, 518 (1948); Grayson, The Use of Statistical Techniques in Cap-
ital Budgeting, in ROBICHIEK, FINANCIAL RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT DE-
cisioNs 98 (1967); Hirsch, Reducing Law's Uncertainty and Complexity,
21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1233, 1234-35 (1974); Girshick, Book Review, 1953
AM. STATISTICAL ASS'N J. 645, 646. This way of thinking about the nature
of the contractual obligation is, of course, urged on us by Holmes. See
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 299-307 (Little Brown ed., 1881); cf. I.
FISHER, NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME 265-66 (1906).
55. In investment terminology, applicable here by analogy, "risk"
refers to the variance in the return on a given investment. An invest-
ment is deemed riskless if a given level of return is guaranteed; it be-
comes riskier as the chances increase that the return will differ from
the expected value. 2 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SE-
CURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 400-01 (1971); cf. F. KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 46-48 (1921) (distinguishes between "risk" and
"uncertainty" and argues that the key to the economic ordering of the fu-
ture is uncertainty). See also C. HARDY, RISK Am RISK-BEAING -1
(2d ed. 1931) ("Risk may be defined as uncertainty in regard to cost,
loss, or damage. In this definition, emphasis is on the word uncer-
tainty."); H. LYON, supra note 54, at 3 ("By economic risk we will mean
uncertainty of having more or less in the future than we have in the pres-
ent."); J. VANHoRNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 134 (3d ed.
1974).
56. R. POSNER, supra note 48, § 3.1 at 41-42; cf. P. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICS 595 (8th ed. 1970) (referring to Professor Knight's "important
theory" that "all true profit is linked with uncertainty").
57. Price is being used here not simply to refer to a dollar figure,
but rather to encompass the array of economic agreements which a con-
tract may embody. Thus, the "price" of a contract to a secured party
includes not only how much he will lend, but a host of related consider-
ations as well (for example, those dealing with the amount and quality
of collateral).
58. A party to a contract is concerned not only with expected re-
turn, but also with the degree of risk associated with an expected return.
See S. BOLTON, SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 4, 132-38(1972); V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 56, 1109 (1972); J. FRANCIS & S. ARCHER, PORTFOLIO ANALY-
SIS 14-17 (1971); W. LEWELLEN, THE COST OF CAPITAL (1969). Thus,
a secured party peering into the future will attempt to construct a matrix
of risk-return probabilities by attaching a quantum of risk to different
possible levels of return. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra, at 49-
66; Note, Giving Substance to the Bonus Rule in Corporate Reorganiza-
tions: The Investment Value Doctrine Analogy, 84 YALE L.J. 932, 942
n.47 (1975). From such a matrix, an "expected value" of return may
be calculated by multiplying the probabilities times their associated vari-
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a bargain, it is reasonable to assume that each favorably regards
the allocation of future risks accomplished by the terms of their
agreement and reflected in the contract price.
A secured contract with an after-acquired property clause,
like any other contract, may be regarded as a device for the
allocation of risk. To determine the nature of the risk allocation
associated with an after-acquired property clause, it is necessary
to isolate the risks peculiar to a specialized contract of this sort.
These special risks define, in part, the expectation interest of a
creditor with a contract right secured by after-acquired inventory
or receivables; they represent a portion of the "price" he is
willing to incur for the debtor's collateralized promise to repay.
Before we can describe the risk allocation embodied in the
contractual bargain that a creditor with a security interest in
after-acquired property has struck with his debtor, it is first
necessary to catalogue the possible (and always, to some extent,
unforeseen) future events that might affect the value of the
creditor's collateral. Against the background of this prelimi-
nary analysis, it should be fairly simple to trace the contours of
the secured creditor's expectation interest.
Events affecting the value of a security interest in after-
acquired property fall into four general categories. The first
category (and the most rewarding one, from the standpoint of a
creditor with a security interest of this sort) includes all events
occurring in the ordinary course of the debtor's business that
increase the overall value of the creditor's collateral. The idea
of an increase in the "ordinary course" of business is a familiar
ous possible levels of return and aggregating the results of these multi-
plications. H. BIERMAN & S. SmIDT, THE CAPITAL BUDGETING DECISION
161-92 (4th ed. 1975); Grayson, supra note 54, at 98-107. That is, where
0, represents the ith possible level of return, and P, represents its associ-
n
ated probability, the expected value (E) may be defined as: E =
i--
P,0,. The expected value, along with the measure of the "spread" of the
ndistribution, called the weighted variance (V), defined as V = I Pt
i=1[(0-E)2], are what a party uses to calculate what he will pay for a con-
tract. See W. SHARPS, supra note 54, at 20-33. See generally S. ARCHER
& C. D'Ammoslo, BusIuss FINANCE: THEORY AND MANAGEMNT 85-103
(1972); W. MENDENHALL, INTRODUCTION TO PROBAEILITY AND STATISTICS 90-
96 (2d ed. 1967); W. SPURR & C. BoNI i, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR BUSI-
NESS DECISIONS 156-57, 195-99 (1967); J. VANHoRNE, supra note 55, at
135-39; T. Y.A , STATISTICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 227-36
(1967). For purposes of this Article, we shall only be using the terr
"expected value" as dqfind abovq,
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one;5 9 yet surprisingly enough, it has never been defined in
precise economic terms. For the purpose of this Article we will
use a definition of gains in the ordinary course of business
which, although not the only possible one,6 0 has the twin advan-
tage of facilitating analytic precision while capturing the intui-
tive meaning which the phrase has in everyday use. In the most
general sense-which is the sense adopted here-a particular
event may be said to occur "in the ordinary course of the
debtor's business" if calculation of the probability of its future
occurrence rests upon "objective" factors.61 To be objectively
determinable, a particular probability need not be statistically
calculable with undeviating precision. Rather, calculation of
the likelihood of a future occurrence is objective when it rests
upon widespread public agreement regarding the considerations
that bear on the calculation in question, and a well-developed
and detailed historical record that permits sound empirical con-
clusions to be drawn respecting those same considerations. Of
course, even the most objective calculation will contain an irre-
ducible element of uncertainty. 62 To be convinced that this is so,
59. Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obliga-
tion, releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives
new value which is to be secured in whole or in part by after-
acquired property his security interest in the after-acquired col-
lateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as
security for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights
in such collateral either in the ordinary course of his business
or under a contract of purchase made pursuant to the security
agreement within a reasonable time after new value is given.
U.C.C. § 9-108. See 2 G. GrLmORE, supra note 3, § 45.6 at 1315; 1970 GIL-
MORE Com-AuTTEE, supra note 6, at 16-17; Skilton, Buyer in Ordinary
Course of Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(and Related Matters), 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1.
60. See text accompanying notes 73-74 infra.
61. Grayson, supra note 54, at 98-107; Von Mises, Probability: An
Objectivist View, in E. MANsFIELD, ELEMENTARY STATISTICS FOR ECONOM-
ics AND BusINEsS 59-67 (1970).
62. Grayson states that "[a]ll probabilities are subjective," and con-
tinues by suggesting:
It is perfectly true that if there is a great amount of "objective"
data, say on interest rates in the past, then these data should
be considered and will strongly influence the subjective prob-
ability assignments to future interest rates. In fact, research has
shown that two decision makers with roughly the same objective
data or past experience, will assign to a future event roughly
the same subjective probabilities if they believe the future will
be similar to the past. But, if one forecaster thinks that there
may be a structural shift in the economy, or has a direct pipeline
to the Federal Reserve Board's thinking, he may alter or throw
away past data in making his probability assignments, and it
is perfectly valid for him to do so.
Grayson, supra note 54, at 98. See also . LYON, supra note 54, at 5
("When contracting for the future thing each man forecasts its future
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one need only recall Hume's famous observation that predic-
tions about the future, based on the record of the past, are
always premised on an assumption that this record itself can
never justify: the assumption that the future will conform to the
past, and will be regular in the same kind of way.63 Despite the
presence in all predictions about the future of a residual uncer-
tainty of this sort, we are convinced that a meaningful distinction
can be drawn between predictions based on objective factors and
those that are not.
64
Of course, in practice no bright and magical line demar-
cates these two classes of predictions: we have presented them
as ideal types that represent merely the theoretical poles of a real
continuum.65 As ideal types, however, they have great explana-
tory power.6 6 In what follows, we shall assume that an event
occurs in the ordinary course of the debtor's business if a
prediction of the likelihood of its future occurrence approxi-
mates the ideal type of objective prediction. For the sake of
simplicity, all increases in the value of a creditor's collateral
resulting from events occurring in the ordinary course of the
debtor's business will be termed "ordinary course gains. ' 67
Common examples of ordinary course gains include in-
creases in the value of the creditor's collateral due to a general
and anticipated expansion of the debtor's business (including a
seasonal and therefore cyclical rather than permanent expan-
sion),68 and increases that result from the routine manufacture
or assembly of collateral. The probability of such an increase
actually occurring will always be less than one,69 since each of
value to himself."); L. SAVAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 3 (1954); W.
SPURR & C. BoNiNi, supra note 58, at 202.
63. D. HUiME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE Bk. I, pt. III, § 6
(1739); D. HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUM-AN UNDERSTANDING pt.
IV, § 1 (1748).
64. Cf. W. SPURR & C. BoNm, supra note 58, at 141; Grayson, supra
note 54.
65. Cf. L. SAVAGE, supra note 62; Grayson, supra note 54. Indeed,
a gain will often be composed of a combination of both. See note 67
infra.
66. M. WEBER, supra note 48, at 92; M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 42-47, 83-112 (1949).
67. Ordinary course gains involve not only the fact of increase, but
also the magnitude of increase. In few real-life situations will the mag-
nitude of the increase be predictable with anything close to certitude-
there are simply too many other variables in the world to allow such
simplification. See note 58 supra.
68. Cf. REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I, at 210; Hogan, supra note 9, at
564-65.
69. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 56, at 582.
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the increases just enumerated might be prevented by some fore-
seen or unforeseen contingency, such as a labor dispute, the loss
of a lawsuit, or a storm or bombardment by a foreign enemy.
Nevertheless, in each case the likelihood of the increase is ob-
jectively determinable given certain information about the
debtor, his history, and his current financial condition.7 0 This is
so because, in each case, there is widespread agreement regard-
ing the relevant questions that analysis of such information is
expected to answer.
Paralleling the class of ordinary course gains is that of
ordinary course losses. These may be defined as decreases in
the overall value of the creditor's collateral that result from
events occurring in the ordinary course of the debtor's
business-decreases whose likelihood is objectively predictable.
Examples include a decline in the value of the debtor's inventory,
where the debtor is engaged in a seasonal industry and the
decline follows immediately upon his usual period of peak sales;
or a decline in the value of a particular piece of fixed equipment
due to wear and tear, obsolescence, and other normal processes
of depreciation.
In addition to the two classes of events described thus far,
ordinary course gains and losses, there are two others that may
affect the value of a security interest in after-acquired property.
We shall call these "windfall gains" and "windfall losses" respec-
tively.7 1 The unifying characteristic of all windfall events,
whether foreseen or totally unexpected, and the essential fact
that distinguishes them from ordinary course gains and losses is
the (relative) absence of an objective basis for determining the
likelihood of their actual occurrence.7 An adequate objective
70. See W. SHARPE, supra note 54, at 25-26. See also note 67 supra;
F. KNIGHT, supra note 55, at 234:
[I]t does not matter how unique the instance, if a real prob-
ability can be calculated, if we can know with certainty how
many successes there would be in (say) one hundred trials if
the one hundred trials could be made.... But in business sit-
uations it so rarely happens that a probability can be computed
for a single unique instance that this qualification has less
weight than might be supposed. However, insofar as objective
probability enters into a calculation, it is hard to imagine an in-
telligent individual considering any single case as absolutely iso-
lated.... The importance of the contingency and probable fre-
quency of recurrence in the individual lifetime of situations simi-
lar in the magnitude of the issues involved should make a differ-
ence in the attitude assumed toward any one case as well as
the mathematical probability of success or failure.
71. U.C.C. § 9-108; REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 210; 1967 G.MoRE
CommITTEE, supra note 8, at 17-18; Kronman, supra note 6, at 144-49, 155.
72. These may be called "subjectively" determined probabilities.
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basis may be lacking either because no consensus has been
reached regarding the considerations relevant to such a determi-
nation, or because the historical record is relatively incomplete
and ambiguous.
In what follows, it is important to remember that the
distinction between foreseen and unforeseen events is merely
related to-and not identical with-the distinction between or-
dinary course and windfall events as we have defined them.
While it is plausible to assume that a creditor reflecting on the
risks associated with a particular contractual venture will be
more likely to contemplate and consider gains and losses which
may arise in the ordinary course of his debtor's business, and
arguably less likely to contemplate windfall gains and losses,
there is no necessary connection between the character of the
event and the fact of its being either foreseen or unforeseen.73
Such a connection would of course exist if we were simply to
define windfall events as those whose occurrence was unforeseen
at the time the contract was negotiated. We have rejected this
definition because it obscures the important conceptual distinc-
tion between those future events which are both foreseen and
objectively determinable, and those which are foreseen but
whose likelihood cannot be predicted on an objective basis.7 4
See W. SPuRu & C. BoNmnr, supra note 58, at 142: "A subjective prob-
ability is an evaluation by the decision-maker of the relative 'likelihood'
of unknown events." Subjective probabilities are personalistic in char-
acter, and rest upon the assumption "that it makes a great deal of sense
to talk about the probability of a single event, without reference to the
repeatability, long-run frequency concept." Grayson, supra note 54,
at 98-107. See also D. FAnRAR, THE INVESTMENT DECISION UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 1-7 (1962). Under a subjective view of probability, "no
probability is unknown to the person concerned, or, at any rate,
he can determine probability only by interrogating himself." L. SAV-
AGE, supra note 62; cf. F. KNIGHT, supra note 54, at 233 (distinguish-
ing "measurable uncertainties" from "unmeasurable uncertainties").
73. The "character" of an event relies on precisely identifiable (one
is tempted, but for the confusion, to use the term "objective") factors;
that is to say, the "character" of an event is determined simply by noting
the presence or absence of an historical record. The character of an
event, however, being determined objectively, has no necessary connec-
tion to the event being foreseen or unforeseen, for the latter determi-
nation depends on a party's private state-of-mind. That is to say,
while an event may be objectively foreseeable, one cannot know whether
or not it is actually foreseen by a person without probing the mind of
that individual. Since that is so, it is perfectly possible for an objectively
foreseeable (e.g., ordinary course) event to be unforeseen; equally, it is
possible for a windfall event to be foreseen.
74. There is another, more practical, reason for rejecting a definition
based on the individualistic state of being foreseen or unforeseen. Such
a definition rests upon a person's state of mind, which is a particularly
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We have also chosen not to define windfall events as those
which are unforeseeable, rather than merely unforeseen. Every
future event is in principle foreseeable,7 5 in the sense that its
possibility can be contemplated in advance. In our view, it is
more illuminating to ask whether the likelihood of a particular
future event is objectively determinable than it is to ask whether
the event can be foreseen at all.
Of course, an individual may still predict the likelihood of
any future occurrence, despite the absence of an objective basis
for doing so.70 However, where an objective basis is not present
to any significant degree, any such prediction must rest upon
one's own idiosyncratic or subjective views regarding both the
considerations relevant to the construction of a risk-return ma-
trix, and the conclusions to be drawn from the available histori-
cal information.77 Put somewhat differently, the weaker the
objective basis for calculating the likelihood of some possible
future event, the less reason there is to believe that the calcula-
tion of one individual will coincide with that of another. Two
or more calculations of this sort may coincide; but in the lim-
iting case, where there is no objective basis whatsoever for the
calculations in question, such a coincidence will be entirely acci-
dental.
A windfall event, then, may be defined as an occurrence
whose prediction rests upon subjective rather than objective
factors. It should be stressed, once again, that an utterly subjec.
tive calculation is as much an ideal type as a calculation that is
perfectly objective in character. Both exist in theory only. No
doubt, ordinary course gains and losses may be of primary
importance to both the secured party and his debtor in framing
the terms of their contractual relationship because they are
objectively determinable and therefore a subject for rational
calculation and bargaining. Nevertheless, windfall gains and
losses represent real risks which may affect the value of the
creditor's collateral and which a secured contract allocates be-
unsuitable foundation on which to rest a factual determination. It makes
proof of an issue that much harder-and the possibility of perjury that
much greater. A party that said "I foresaw that event"-as would be
the temptation if a question of entitlement rested upon such a perception
-could force an unsatisfactory factual issue on the trier of fact.
75. See L. SAVAGE, supra note 62.
76. W. SPURR & C. BoNmN, supra note 58, at 142; Grayson, supra
note 54.
77. See note 72, supra; cf. C. CLARK & L. ScHmuE, STATISTICAL
METHODS FOR Bvrn, =ss DEcISIONS 147 (1969).
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tween the parties. Examples of windfall gains and losses include
the following: 1) an increase in the value of the debtor's
inventory resulting from the unanticipated imposition of an
export embargo by a new and revolutionary government upon
all products of the debtor's chief foreign competitor; 2) a de-
crease in the value of the debtor's inventory and equipment due
to the revolutionary invention of a new, and less costly, process
of manufacture in the debtor's own line of business; and 3) the
contraction or expansion of the debtor's receivables following a
change in the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Board, the
effect of which is either to reduce or increase the overall cost
of credit in the economy as a whole. 78
With these four categories of risk in mind we are now in a
position to describe the expectations of a creditor with a security
interest in after-acquired property regarding fluctuations in the
value of his collateral. Since our main concern is with deter-
mining the extent to which these expectations are protected or
upset in bankruptcy, we shall limit our discussion to fluctuations
occurring within the statutorily established pre-bankruptcy pref-
erence period.
The behavior of a rational creditor is easy to describe. In
determining the advantages of a proposed security arrangement,
he will first identify all of the relevant risks79 that may affect the
value of his collateral. Of course, in so doing he will know that
he has not identified all of the risks that may conceivably be
involved. No human being could ever do this. Although by def-
inition he does not know what these unforeseen risks are, he will
treat the aggregated benefits and burdens they represent as equal
to zero,80 and therefore as factors that are not themselves rel-
78. Cf. Grayson, supra note 54.
79. The concept of "limited attention" suggests that, in reality, a
party does not explicitly consider all possible future events-indeed, that
would be an infinite chore. Rather, he selects and analyzes those events
which he considers central. Cf. Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons,
Inc., 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 1941); Soci6t6 Franco Tunisienne d'Arm-
enent v. Sidermar S.P.A., 2 Q.B. 278 (1960). See generally Farnsworth,
Dispute Over Omission in Contracts, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 860, 868-69
(1968).
80. This conclusion is supported by the so-called "principle of insuf-
ficient reason":
This principle is used to assign probabilities to outcomes in
the absence of any information. When we have no evidence at
all, the possible cases are taken to be equally probable. Thus
Laplace reasoned that when we are drawing from two urns each
containing a different ration of black to red balls, but we have
no information as to which urn we are faced with, then we
should assume initially that the chance of drawing from each
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evant in deciding whether to enter the contract at any given
price."' Because unforeseen risks factor out in this way, we will
only describe the contractual allocation of those risks that the
creditor has actually identified.
Where the risks are associated with ordinary course gains
and losses (and such risks are quite likely to be identified
because their prediction rests upon considerations and historical
data which the parties share and comprehend), it is surely
correct to assume that the creditor expects to reap their benefits
and bear their burdens respectively. The pleasant prospect of the
one together with the uneasy apprehension of the other form the
core of his expectation interest. Are the risks associated with
windfall gain and loss also contractually allocated between the
parties? At first blush, an affirmative answer might appear to
be counter-intuitive. If the likelihood of windfall gains and
losses can be estimated on the basis of subjective factors only, it
might seem unreasonable to regard the contract as a deliberate
of these urns is the same. The idea is that the state of ignorance
on the basis of which these prior probabilities are assigned pre-
sents the same sort of problem as the situation where one has
a lot of evidence showing that a particular coin is unbiased.
What is distinctive about the use of the principle is that it en-
ables one to incorporate different kinds of information within
one strictly probabilistic framework and to draw inferences
about probabilities even in the absence of knowledge.... The
limiting case of no information does not pose a theoretical prob-
lem.
J. RAWLs, A THEORY or JUSTICE 168-69 (1971). See also W. FELLNER,
PROBABILITY AND PROFIT 27 (1965); F. KERLINGER, FoUNDAToNs oF BE-
HAVIORAL RESEARcH 56-57 (1964).
81. An important theoretical qualification does not affect our cen-
tral concern, which rests on the fact that these unpredicted events have
an aggregate expected return which may be presumed to be zero. The
theoretical qualification focuses on risk, and not return. The fact that
the return on unforeseen events is presumed to be zero does not mean
that these factors may not affect the contract price; they may, depending
on the party's perception of their aggregate importance vis-a-vis identi-
fied future risks. That is to say, presuming our parties to be risk averse,
a high risk contract with an expected return of zero (the hypothetical
flip of a coin where heads represents a $10,000 gain and tails a $10,000
loss) will be worth less than a low risk contract with an expected return
of zero (a $5 gain on heads and a $5 loss on tails). See generally W.
LEWELLEN, supra note 58. Similarly, a contract perceived to be relatively
risky-of which a factor will be the perceived relative proportion of un-
foreseen risks vis-a-vis foreseen risks-will carry a lower contract value
than a contract of equal expected return perceived to be relatively risk
free. This qualification, however, which is concerned with how risk af-
fects value, does not affect our primary concern here, which needs to
rely only on the balance between unforeseen gains and losses, which we
do know.
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"meeting of the minds"'8 2 that embodies an agreement respecting
the distribution of such risks.
Although the bargain struck by the parties may be based
on substantially different subjective perceptions concerning the
likelihood of future windfall events, it is true nevertheless that
each has contracted on the basis of a particular set of expecta-
tions regarding the risks entailed by contingencies of this sort.8 3
From the creditor's point of view the risk-return matrix associat-
ed with all future events, windfall as well as ordinary course,
must be a favorable one, at least given the contract "price" on
which the creditor and his debtor have agreed; were this not so,
the creditor would have been unwilling to enter the contract in
the first place. It seems plausible to conclude, therefore, that a
secured party "expects" to receive all gains and to suffer all
losses that may be characterized as windfalls in the technical
sense used above. For this reason, an allocation of windfall
risks that lets windfall losses lie, while depriving the secured
party of any windfall gain, would interfere with his bargained-
for expectation interest.8
4
III. TREATMENT OF THE EXPECTATION
INTEREST IN BANKRUPTCY
The value of a security interest in after-acquired property
will, of course, fluctuate with the value of the collateral itself. In
the preceding section, we suggested that a secured party has the
82. Woburn Nat'l Bank v. Woods, 77 N.H. 172, 175, 89 A. 491, 492
(1914); L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 257 (3rd ed.
1972); Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, 14 ILL. L.
REV. 85 (1919). On the question of "risk," the so-called "grubstake con-
tract" cases are instructive. See, e.g., Emobola v. Tuppella, 127 Wash.
285, 220 P. 789 (1923).
83. This follows from two prior assumptions: first, that the prob-
ability of all events may be subjectively calculated by a party, see notes
62 & 72, supra; and second, that a rational party will contract based upon
such a calculation, cf. W. SHARPE, supra note 54, at 24-26; W. LEw-
LLEN, supra note 58. It follows that a party, in reaching a decision as
to whether or not to enter a given contract at a particular price will
consider his calculation of the expected value of windfall as well as or-
dinary course events. Cf. Llewellen, What Price Contract?-An Essay
in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 722-26 (1931).
84. A similar point has been made forcefully by Professor Brudney
in discussing the Bankruptcy Commission's proposed "second look" into
corporate reorganizations, Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission's Pro-
posed "Modifications" of the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 AM. BANIM. L.J.
305 (1974). See also Note, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act: Changes in
the Absolute Priority Rule for Corporate Reorganizations, 87 HAnv. L.
REV. 1786 (1974).
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following contractual expectations with respect to the four cate-
gories of risk previously identified: On the one hand, he has
bargained for, and expects to receive, all ordinary course and
windfall gains; on the other hand, he has assumed the risk of,
and expects to suffer, both ordinary course and windfall losses.
Together these four elements of risk allocation constitute the
expectation interest of a creditor with a security interest in after-
acquired property, so far as fluctuations in the value of his
collateral are concerned. How is this expectation interest treat-
ed in bankruptcy, under the preference sections of the present
and proposed Acts?
Under the present Act, it has been clear for some time"5
that the secured party's expectation interest, as defined above,
will be protected completely in bankruptcy.8 6 As section 60 is
presently construed, a creditor with a security interest in after-
acquired property receives the benefit of all increases in the
value of his collateral during the pre-bankruptcy preference
period whether due to windfall or ordinary course events. Simi-
larly, he suffers all decreases in the value of his collateral during
the same period-again, regardless of the nature of the event
causing the loss. This, of course, is precisely the distribution of
risk for which the secured party bargains. Because it does not
in any way interfere with this distribution, section 60 gives
unqualified protection to the secured party's expectation interest.
The "two-point net improvement test" adopted in the pref-
erence section of the proposed Act 8 7 treats the secured party's
expectation interest less generously. Because it flatly condemns
all "improvements" in the position of the secured party that
occur during the preference period,8 8 the proposed Act deprives
him of both ordinary course and windfall gains. At the same
85. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
86. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
87. Section 4-607 (proposed Act).
88. Following Professor Homer Kripke's suggestion, see Letter from
Professor Homer Kripke to the Commission on the Coordination of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act, Sept. 17, 1970, in
REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 210, the draftsmen of § 4-607 incorporated
language which states that the improvement in the position of a creditor
must be "at the expense ofthe [debtor's] estate" to be voidable by the
trustee. § 4-607 (d). This language, however, appears to be without ef-
fect since the section goes on to state that the creditor who has improved
his position within the meaning of the "two-point net improvement" test,
has, by definition, improved his position at "the expense of the estate."
See § 4-607 (d) (quoted in note 31 supra). See also Kronman, supra note
6, at 154-55.
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time, it does nothing to redistribute ordinary course or windfall
losses. Thus, while the secured party must sustain both types of
losses, as he must under the present Act, he loses the benefit of
both types of gain that the present Act permits him to retain.
Although the language of the proposed preference section
seems to require this result,8 9 it is not entirely consistent with the
general theory of preferences that the draftsmen of that section
offered to elucidate and justify its provisions. ° One of the
authors of this Article has suggested elsewhere that the "two-
point net improvement test" be modified to better reflect the
analysis and conclusion embodied in the draftsmen's theory. 1 It
is unnecessary to recapitulate the reasons adduced in support of
the suggested modifications; 92 but it is important for our purpos-
es to note the impact these modifications would have on the
contractually-defined expectation interest of a creditor with a
security interest in after-acquired property. Under what we
shall call the "modified proposed Act," a creditor with a security
interest of this sort retains only those preference-period gains (to
the extent they represent net improvements) that occur in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business; by contrast, he is
deprived of all windfall gains, and made to suffer all losses,
windfall or ordinary course.92 Thus, the modified proposed Act
frustrates the expectation interest of the secured party only to the
89. Kronman, supra note 6, at 146-47; see note 88, supra.
90. Kronman, supra note 6, at 146-47.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Our principal object has been to describe the conceptual differ-
ences between these four categories of risk. Of course, in an actual bank-
ruptcy proceeding it remains to be determined in which category any
particular gain or loss is to be placed. In establishing a procedure for
making such determinations, a variety of factors should be kept in mind.
See REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I at 81-82; 1970 GmMORE CoMMIrTE, supra
note 6, at 17; Kronman, supra note 6, at 145-50. As the draftsmen of
section 4-607 themselves recognized, it is the case that "[iJn the normal
course of a business declining into bankruptcy the position of an inven-
tory or receivables lender, far from improving, will almost certainly de-
teriorate." 1970 GILMORE COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 17. Because this
is so, it is reasonable to begin with the presumption that any increase
in the value of collateral occurring during the preference period repre-
sents a windfall gain. This presumption should be a rebuttable one,
however: the secured party should be permitted, in every case, to show
that his gain has occurred in the ordinary course of his debtor's business.
To do so, the secured party would need to show that the risk of such
a gain was an objective one in the twofold sense discussed above. See
text accompanying notes 61-62 supra. See also Kronman, supra note
6, at 149.
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extent that it deprives him of the benefit of windfall gains.9 4 For
this reason, it may be viewed as a distinct alternative to both the
present and proposed Acts. We shall treat it as such.
IV. COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF
COMPETING PREFERENCE SCHEMES
Having identified three different schemes for treating a
creditor's expectation interest regarding fluctuations in the value
of after-acquired property, we now propose to evaluate each
alternative, first in terms of its attractiveness to the secured
party, and then, as a means of reconciling the basic policy conflict
that underlies preference law. From the standpoint of the se-
cured party himself, we find-not surprisingly-that the three
can be ranked in a definite order of preference. It is clear that
the secured party will prefer the modified proposed Act to the
proposed Act in its unmodified form, for while the former gives
him a benefit-ordinary course gains-that the latter does not,
the burdens he must bear are the same in both cases. For
similar reasons, the secured party will prefer the present Act to
the modified proposed Act: the first gives him all the benefits of
the second, and more-windfall gains-without imposing any
additional burdens.
It is an easy matter to evaluate the relative attractiveness of
these three preference schemes from the perspective of the se-
cured party because he is interested in advancing but one of the
underlying policies whose conflict constitutes the principal di-
lemma that the law of preferences must resolve. The secured
party will quite naturally favor protection of his contractual
expectation interest to the exclusion of anything else.95 Conse-
94. Kronman, supra note 6, at 144-50.
95. Just as the class of secured creditors may be said to be the pro-
ponents of one of the two policy considerations at work in preference
law, so too, their unsecured counterparts, as a class, may rightly be
called the standard-bearers of the competing policy consideration, see
Kronman, supra note 6, at 142. The referees in bankruptcy, generally
drawn from the class of attorneys who represent unsecured creditors, are
the acknowledged champions of the position that "equality is equity."
2 G. GIMORE, supra note 3, § 45.2, at 1287-88. The following, not surpris-
ingly, is from the Fifth Seminar for Referees in Bankruptcy, held in 1968:
It is quite obvious that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code was not written by bankruptcy lawyers or at least those
customarily representing trustees in bankruptcy. The philos-
ophy of its provisions honestly seems to me to be that financial
institutions, or perhaps in some cases major suppliers are de-
serving of higher rights than are employees, service trades, gov-
ernment, professional people or anyone else. It seems to reject
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quently, when we shift our focus and evaluate these same three
schemes in terms of their comparative success in reconciling the
competing policies that form the foundation of preference law, it
is perfectly understandable that a different rank order should
emerge.
The ordering that results when one adopts this broader and
more complex perspective is similar in one important respect to
the hierarchy of preference schemes that would be established by
the secured party himself. From either perspective, the advan-
tages of the modified proposed Act outweigh those of its unmod-
ified counterpart. We have already seen why the secured party
will draw this conclusion. The modified proposed Act also
offers a more satisfactory resolution of the fundamental policy
conflict underlying preference law in general. The proposed
Act, in its unmodified form, resolves this conflict by simply
refusing to protect the creditor's expectation interest in any but
the most Pickwickian sense. By depriving the secured party of
the benefit of any preference period increase in the value of his
collateral, the unmodified proposed Act denies him the most
valuable element of his bargained-for expectation interest. To
be sure, the proposed Act, as it now stands, would "protect" his
expectations regarding losses sustained during the preference
period. But this is hardly an advantage from the secured party's
perspective. By denying him the benefits of his contract with
the debtor, while kequiring him to bear its burdens, the unmodi-
fied proposed Act effectively destroys the expectation interest of
the secured party and upsets the balance of benefits and burdens
on which his bargain with the debtor is founded.
the idea that those who took the risk of extending credit to a
man in business should in the event of his failure share in pro-
portion to the amount of credit they have outstanding or in other
words, pro rata. In its place, there are provisions under which
the large and diligent financial institution can substitute a device
under which it can say in effect "This debtor belongs to me. All
that he now owns and all that he owns in the future are subject
to what he now owes me and what credit I may choose to ad-
vance him in the future. I need make a matter of public record
little more than the fact that I have this security on everything.
I need not know at any given point of time what specific prop-
erty is security for my claims and he need not account to me
if I do not choose to require it. I can allow him as complete
freedom as I choose, but in case he gets into trouble, then he
is mine. After I am satisfied in full, then anyone else who de-
sires may share in the gleanings."
This device is loosely termed "the floating lien" . ...
Statement of Referee Daniel R. Cowans, Tenth Round Table Discussion,
contained in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH SEA'NAR FOR REFEREES IN BANi-
RUPTCY 337 (1968).
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By shifting at least some of the costs of bankruptcy from
the class of unsecured creditors to those holding security inter-
ests, the unmodified proposed Act reduces the overall economic
dislocation that bankruptcy is apt to cause. In so doing, it
advances one of the principal objectives of preference law. Un-
fortunately, it achieves this result by flatly disregarding the other
interest that preference law must protect: the contractual
expectations of the debtor's creditors. The modified proposed
Act, however, strikes a balance between these two objectives. On
the one hand, it deprives the secured party of the benefit of all
windfall gains occurring during the preference period; to this
extent, it frustrates his contractual expectations and shifts to him
a financial burden that would otherwise be borne by the bank-
rupt's unsecured creditors. On the other hand, it permits the
secured party to retain the benefits of all ordinary course gains:
to this extent, it protects his contractual expecations and pre-
serves his priority vis--vis unsecured claimants. The modified
proposed Act therefore represents a genuine compromise; the
unmodified proposed Act does not.
Similarly, the modified proposed Act offers a better balance
of these competing policies than does the present Act. This, of
course, reverses the rank ordering the secured party himself
would establish.96 As we have seen, he prefers the present Act
because it protects his contractual expectations in an unqualified
fashion. It is precisely for this reason, however, that the present
Act must be regarded as an inadequate compromise between
conflicting policies. Since it does not deprive the secured party
of any of the benefits for which he has bargained, the present
Act fails to redistribute the costs of bankruptcy and thereby
soften its social and economic impact. This, in its own way, is
as one-sided and uncompromising a solution as that embodied in
the unmodified proposed Act. While the present Act bestows
total protection upon the expectation interest of the secured
party, under the unmodified proposed Act the same interest is
not protected at all. The latter may of course make sense as a
polemical response; however, it no more strikes a balance be-
tween the conflicting interests, whose struggle animates prefer-
ence law, than does the scheme contained in the present Act.
Because it is the task of any preference scheme to achieve a
compromise between these interests, both the present Act and
the proposed Act, in its unmodified form, offer solutions to the
96. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
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basic dilemma of preference law which are less satisfactory than
that contained in the modified proposed Act. Each emphasizes
one of the competing policies to the exclusion of the other;
neither strikes a balance between the two. The preference
scheme contained in the modified proposed Act, on the other
hand, represents a genuine compromise that offers considerable
protection to the expectation interest of the secured party, while
at the same time effecting a partial redistribution of the inevita-
ble social costs of bankruptcy. The principal strength of the
modified proposed Act is that it strikes a balance between com-
peting policies. We believe the balance is a sensible one. t
At this point, it is tempting to consider whether we can
devise a fourth preference scheme that would effect as substan-
tial a redistribution of costs as that achieved by the modified
proposed Act, without infringing as seriously upon the interests
of secured creditors as a class. If a scheme of this sort is
possible, it would strike a balance preferable to the one con-
tained in the modified proposed Act. Does such a scheme exist?
We may begin by specifying the way in which the modified
proposed Act fails to completely protect the secured party's
expectation interest. As we have already seen, the secured party
expects windfall gains and losses to be treated symmetrically,"
in that he has bargained both for the benefit of windfall gains,
and for the burden of windfall losses. Under the modified
proposed Act, however, these risks are treated in an asymmetri-
cal manner: the secured party is deprived of windfall gains, but
made to suffer windfall losses. Such asymmetrical treatment
skews his pre-bankruptcy contractual expectations. The sugges-
tion that a secured party does not bargain for windfall gains and
that he may therefore be deprived of them without interefering
with his contractual expectation interest9 9 rests upon the widely
97. There are, of course, numerous ways in which a compromise be-
tween these two competing policies may be reached, as well as numerous
points at which the balance may be struck. While we do not pretend
that the modified proposed act provides the only real, or feasible, com-
promise, we do believe it is sensible, in that the basis for the compromise
rests upon distinctions that are commonplace: a distinction between or-
dinary course events and windfall events. These concepts are familiar,
even if the definitional method we have chosen here is not. The recog-
nition of a meaningful distinction between these two types of events,
when coupled with the probability that ordinary course events will pro-
vide the stimulus for entering such a contract, see text accompanying
note 78 supra, provides a rational compromise, without serious adverse
effects on the marketplace for credit.
98. See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
99. Kronman, supra note 6, at 144:
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held, but incorrect, belief that windfalls are not "deserved."' 00
We have seen, however, that windfall gains do form a part of the
secured party's contractual expectation interest. There may be
strong policy reasons for depriving him of these gains, while
leaving him with his windfall losses, but this result cannot be
defended on the ground that it accurately reflects the secured
party's bargained-for expectations.10 1
This asymmetry might be cured by constructing a prefer-
ence scheme that would compensate the secured party for wind-
fall losses, while depriving him of windfall gains. Such a
scheme would modify the secured party's pre-bankruptcy con-
tractual entitlements by depriving him of a right he had bar-
gained for (the right to windfall gains), while investing him
with one for which he had not bargained (the right to be
compensated for windfall losses). Despite this interference with
the secured party's expectation interest, the scheme in question
would neutralize the overall impact of windfall events upon
secured creditors as a class. 10 2 Although the treatment accord-
ed any particular creditor under this scheme would differ from
that provided under the present Act,'10 3 in the aggregate the
claims of secured creditors as a class would receive nearly identi-
cal treatment under either arrangement. For this reason, our
hypothetical fourth scheme may be regarded as functionally
equivalent to the present Act, insofar as the interests of secured
creditors as a class are concerned. It should be noted, however,
that any individual creditor might well prefer the present Act to
a scheme of this sort if he were convinced for subjective reasons
Secondly, and not as obviously, a secured party should be denied
the benefit of any "windfall" increase in the value of his collat-
eral during the immediate pre-bankruptcy period .... Since
the secured party did not bargain for a windfall of this type,
he has not given anything to the debtor's estate, by way of con-
sideration, that might entitle him to appropriate to himself the
entire benefit of the windfall.
Cf. U.C.C. § 9-108, Comment.
100. R. PosNxa, supra note 48, at 84.
101. For a demonstration of the validity of a similar assertion, see
Brudney, supra note 84; cf. Note, supra note 58, at 942-43 n.48.
102. The expected value of windfall gains equals the expected value
of windfall losses, when considering them in the aggregate. See, e.g.,
F. KERLiNGER, supra note 80, at 56-57; cf. Fama, Random Walks in
Stock Market Prices, in E. ELTON & M. GRUBER, SEcURITY EVALUATION
AND PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 42 (1972); L. LAPIN, STATISTICS FOR MODEN
BusnyEss DECISIONS 382-83 (1973).
103. It would upset the contractual arrangement whereby the se-
cured creditor got to keep windfall gains and was forced to suffer wind-
fall losses.
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that his chances of reaping a windfall gain exceeded those of
incurring a windfall loss. Only as a class will secured parties
necessarily be as well-protected under the fourth scheme as they
are under the present Act.
Unfortunately, from the broader perspective of preference
law as a whole, our fourth scheme is as seriously deficient as
both the present Act and the proposed Act in its unmodified
form. Under our fourth scheme, secured creditors would occa-
sionally lose the benefit of windfall gains to which they would
otherwise be entitled; at the same time, and just as frequently,10 4
they would be compensated for windfall losses they would other-
wise have to absorb. As a result, secured creditors, as a class,
would be as well off under the fourth scheme as they are under
the present Act.10 In neither case will the costs of bankruptcy
be significantly redistributed between secured and unsecured
creditors as a class. From a broad policy standpoint, therefore,
this fourth preference scheme is certainly no better than the one
set out in the present Act and may be inferior to the present
scheme because of the special administrative difficulties it
poses.1 6 For reasons already explored, 1'0 7 we therefore conclude
that this fourth possible scheme is distinctly inferior to the one
contained in the modified proposed Act, and that the latter
represents the only treatment of preferences that protects the
expectation interest of the secured party in a qualified fashion,
while simultaneously effecting a partial redistribution of the
costs of bankruptcy itself.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been our aim, in this Article, to delineate the basic
features of an objective theory of preferences, and to demon-
strate the instrumental value of such a theory by using it to
evaluate the relative merits of four distinct solutions to one of the
most vexing problems in preference law: the treatment of secur-
ity interests in after-acquired property. Our principal thesis
may be stated quite simply: the success of any preference
104. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
105. See note 102 supra.
106. The administrative costs of intervention to resolve disputes that
arise from this reversal of contractual entitlements would appear to be
substantial. And, of course, administrative cost is a real factor to weigh
in considering bankruptcy statutes. REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I, at 81-
82.
107. See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
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provision that empowers a trustee in bankruptcy to avoid certain
security transfers occurring within a specified temporal period
will depend upon the extent to which the preference scheme in
question is able to realize, simultaneously, two conflicting
goals-protection of the secured party's pre-bankruptcy contrac-
tual expectations, and minimization of the social costs of bank-
ruptcy itself. Because these goals inevitably conflict, no prefer-
ence scheme can realize both in an unqualified fashion. If both
are to be realized, each must also be compromised to some
extent. This general theoretical premise is the touchstone we
have employed in evaluating the treatment of security interests
in after-acquired property under the four preference schemes
considered in this Article. To what extent the theoretical model
offered here may be useful in the analysis of other preference
problems is, of course, an open question. We are, however,
optimistic that it may be fruitfully applied to other areas of
preference law. Our optimism is based on two facts: one is the
generality of the theory itself, and the other is its demonstrated
success in illuminating the most intractible-the most written
about' 0 -problem in contemporary preference law.
Only under the modified proposed Act is the treatment of a
security interest in after-acquired property based on a genuine
compromise between the competing and independently desirable
goals of protecting the secured party's expectation interest and
minimizing the social costs of bankruptcy. 0 9 Of the three
remaining schemes that we have considered, none embodies a
compromise of this sort, at least with respect to the transfer of
security interests in after-acquired property occurring within the
stipulated pre-bankruptcy period." 0 From the necessarily one-
sided perspective of the secured party himself, the modified
proposed Act is less attractive than the present Act because it
upsets his expectations regarding the treatment of windfall
events and the objectively incalculable risks they represent.
When viewed from the broader perspective of a general theory
of preferences, however, this dissatisfaction and apparent illog-
ic' may be seen for what it truly is: the reflection of the logic
108. See Kronman, supra note 6, at 122-31.
109. Reconciling protection of the expectation interest with other and
competing policies is a familiar problem in other areas of commercial
law. See generally R. POUND, supra note 48, at 166; Note, The Economic
Implications of the Doctrine of Impossibility, 26 HASTwGS L.. 1251
(1975).
110. See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
111. The apparent illogic comes from the asymmetry, see text ac-
companying notes 98-101 supra.
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of compromise itself. One of the powerful attractions of this
theory of preferences is that it allows us the luxury of a princi-
pled choice in an area of the law where principles have remained
elusive and inarticulate. This may not be a reason for adopting
the theory, but it is surely one of the collateral benefits of doing
SO.
